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PLAYER DISCIPLINE IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS: THE
ANTITRUST ISSUES
JOHN C. WEISTART*
INTRODUCTION

One of the most frequently disputed aspects of the relationships
which underlie professional sports is the power claimed by clubs and
league commissioners to discipline athletes.' Provisions for discipline may be invoked to discourage a wide variety of activities,
including gambling,' criticizing game officials,3 associating with
"undesirables," 4 and failing to observe the rules of competition.'
The penalties which may be imposed also cover a wide range, from
mere reprimands to lengthy - and in some cases, lifetime - suspensions.' A question arises as to the legal principles which might
Copyright © 1977 John C. Weistart.
* B.A., Illinois Wesleyan University; J.D., Duke University. Professor of Law, Duke University.
This Article is based on materials from a forthcoming book by John C. Weistart and Cym
H. Lowell, entitled THE LAW OF SPORTS, to be published by the Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc. All
rights reserved. The author wishes to thank Michael Ellis and June Hubbard for their very
valuable assistance in the preparation of this Article.
1. See generally Molinas v. National Basketball Ass'n, 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961);
Molinas v. Podoloff, 133 N.Y.S.2d 743 (Sup. Ct. 1954); American League Baseball Club v.
Johnson, 109 Misc. 138, 179 N.Y.S. 498 (1919), aff'd, 190 App. Div. 932, 179 N.Y.S. 898 (1920);
Alyluia, ProfessionalSports Contractsand the Players'Association,5 MANITOBA L.J. 359, 38670 (1973); Comment, Discipline in Professional Sports: The Need for Player Protection, 60
GEo. L.J. 771 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Discipline in Sports]; Interview: Pete Rozelle,
PLAYBOY, Oct. 1973, at 65.
2. See, e.g., Molinas v. National Basketball Ass'n, 190 F. Supp. 241, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1961)
(basketball player suspended for placing bets on his team); N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1970, at 48,
col. 1 (baseball player Denny McLain suspended for gambling activities); id., Mar. 17, 1964,
at 41, col. 1 (football players Paul Hornung and Alex Karras suspended).
3. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1975, at 47, col. 1 (baseball player Bill Madlock fined
for abusive language and throwing helmet in confrontation with umpire); id., Mar. 19, 1975,
at 63, col. 7 (Kareem Abdul-Jabbar challenged fine levied by NBA for his public criticism of
referee).
4. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1970, at 48, col. 1 (baseball player Denny McLain suspended for associating with gamblers); cf. id., July 20, 1969, § 5, at 1, col. 1 (NFL Commissioner suggests that football players, including Joe Namath, avoid frequenting establishments suspected of housing gambling activities).
5. See, e.g., Manok v. Southeast Dist. Bowling Ass'n, 306 F. Supp. 1212, 1218 (C.D. Cal.
1969) (bowler Ralph Manok suspended for bowling with a partner who used a false name);
cf. Blalock v. Ladies Professional Golf Ass'n, 359 F. Supp. 1260, 1262 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (golfer
Jane Blalock accused of moving her ball illegally).
6. The league's and club's vast power of discipline is usually said to have its legal basis in
the consent of the player. See, e.g., Molinas v. Podoloff, 133 N.Y.S.2d 743, 747 (Sup. Ct.
1954); Discipline in Sports, supra note 1, at 780-81. Not surprisingly, the standard player
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be applied to limit the discretion of clubs and leagues in punishing
their players. This Article explores the role which the antitrust laws
can play in providing a framework for judicial review of these actions.
It is increasingly clear that, with the exception of baseball,' procontract is the vehicle through which this consent is secured. See, e.g., Standard Player's
Contract, National Football League 4 (1975):
The Player agrees at all times to comply with and be bound by: the Constitution and By-Laws, Rules and Regulations of the League, of the Club and the
decisions of the Commissioner of the League (hereinafter called
"Commissioner"), which shall be final, conclusive and unappealable. The enumerated Constitution, By-Laws, Rules and Regulations are intended to include
the present Constitution, By-Laws, Rules and Regulations as well as all amendments thereto, all of which are by reference incorporated herein. If the Player
fails to comply with said Constitution, By-Laws, Rules and Regulations, the
Club shall have the right to terminate this contract as provided in Paragraph 6
hereof or to take such other action as may be specified in said Constitution, ByLaws, Rules and Regulations, subject, however, to the right to a hearing by the
Commissioner. All matters in dispute between the Player and the Club shall be
referred to the Commissioner and his decision shall be accepted as final, complete, conclusive, binding and unappealable, by the Player and by the Club. The
Player, if involved or affected in any manner whatsoever by a decision of the
Commissioner, whether the decision results from a dispute between the Player
and the Club or otherwise, hereby releases and discharges the Commissioner,
the League, each Club in the League, each Director, Officer, Stockholder, Owner
or Partner of any Club in the League, each employee, agent, official or representative of the League or of any Club in the League, jointly and severally, individually and in their official capacities, of and from any and all claims, demands,
damages, suits, actions and causes of action whatsoever, in law or in equity,
arising out of or in connection with any decision of the Commissioner, except
to the extent of awards made by the Commissioner to the Player. The Player
hereby acknowledges that he has read the present said Constitution, By-Laws,
Rules and Regulations, and that he understands their meaning.
7. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S.
356 (1953); Federal Baseball Club, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs,
259 U.S. 200 (1922). The Supreme Court's original rationale for excluding baseball from the
reach of the antitrust laws was that the activity did not involve interstate commerce. Federal
Baseball Club, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, supra at 208-09.
According to the Court, the activities involved - baseball exhibitions - were "purely state
affairs." Id. at 208. The transportation of players across state lines was "a mere incident, not
the essential thing." Id. at 209. The Court expressly reaffirmed Federal Baseball in Toolson
v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953) (per curiam). It premised its decision,
however, on the fact that Congress had considered the baseball exemption and had not
abolished it. Id. Moreover, the Court observed that "[the business has thus been left for
thirty years to develop, on the understanding that it was not subject to existing antitrust
legislation." Id. The Supreme Court considered the exemption for a third time in Flood v.
Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972). In Flood the Court recognized that baseball was a business in
interstate commerce. Id. at 282. Additionally, the majority recognized the anomaly of granting antitrust immunity to baseball while denying a similar status to other professional sports.
Id. at 282-84. Nevertheless, the Court stated that "the aberration is an established one" and
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fessional sports are within the scope of the antitrust laws.' To date,
most sports-related antitrust cases have dealt with player restraints,
those restrictions limiting the mobility and bargaining power of
athletes.9 These cases have served to focus attention on the capacity
of the sports industry to create and define the market for professional athletic talent. It should quickly become apparent that the
rules governing player discipline also have an effect upon the demand for players' services. Thus, it is appropriate to examine the
application of these rules and to determine whether they are reasonable in light of the general federal policy favoring a free and competitive market.'"
THE RULE OF REASON

We begin our discussion by considering the principles which will
be applied where the sanction involves suspending the athlete from
competition. The other common sanction - the imposition of monis "fully entitled to the benefit of staredecisis ....
Id. at 282. Through its positive inaction,
Congress had "clearly evinced a desire not to disapprove" the Court's grant of immunity. Id.
at 283-84.
For a general discussion of the baseball exemption, see J. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS
AND TRADE REGULATION, §§ 50.01-.04 (Supp. 1976); Eckler, Baseball - Sport or Commerce?,
17 U. CHI. L. REV. 56 (1949); Gromley, Baseball and the Anti-Trust Laws, 34 NEB. L. REv.
597 (1955); Pierce, Organized Professional Team Sports and the Antitrust Laws, 43 CORNELL
L.Q. 566 (1958); Topkins, Monopoly in Professional Sports, 58 YALE L.J. 691 (1949); Note,
Baseball Players and the Antitrust Laws, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 242 (1953); Comment,
Monopsony in Manpower: Organized Baseball Meets the Antitrust Laws, 62 YALE L.J. 576
(1953).
8. See, e.g., Haywood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204, 1205 (Douglas, Circuit
Justice, 1971); Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 452 (1957); United States
v. International Boxing Club, Inc., 348 U.S. 236, 241-42 (1955); Philadelphia World Hockey
Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 466 (E.D. Pa. 1972). See also
Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282-83 (1972) (dictum).
9. See, e.g., Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976) (Rozelle
Rule); Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (college
player draft and perpetual reserve system); Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (NHL reserve clause).
10. As players' associations assume a more predominant role in the representation of athletes, the matter of discipline becomes increasingly enmeshed with the principles of federal
labor law. Before the clubs and league commissioners can claim the benefit of the nonstatutory labor exemption to the antitrust laws, however, they first must establish that the particular disciplinary rules were the result of serious, arm's length collective bargaining with the
players' associations. Cf., e.g., Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 614, 623
(8th Cir. 1976); Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc.,
351 F. Supp. 462, 499 (E.D. Pa. 1972). In most of the situations that exist today, however,
courts are likely to find that the disciplinary rules imposed were the product of unilateral
action by the clubs and commissioners. Cf., e.g., Mackey v. National Football League, supra
at 616.
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etary fines - is treated in a subsequent section." And to bring the
antitrust issues into somewhat clearer focus, this initial inquiry will
assume that the discipline is imposed by the league, rather than the
club. The issues peculiar to club-imposed sanctions are also treated
separately below.' 2 Thus, we will first be concerned with league
suspensions, a form of discipline which may have severe economic
consequences for the athlete involved.
Although such suspensions may be imposed for a variety of reasons, the few cases in this area suggest that allegations that the
participant has cheated in competition or has bet on the outcome
of his or her performance are particularly apt to prompt this drastic
measure.' 3 Such a suspension has many of the attributes of a group
boycott.' When a league denies an athlete the right to continue
playing, there is, in effect, a joint agreement among the member
clubs that they will refuse to deal with the player for the period of
the suspension. This joint action produces an injury, for the athlete
is precluded from selling his or her services to the group and thus is
denied an important means of livelihood. If this characterization
were accepted without qualification, the legal result would be clear,
for concerted refusals to deal are usually treated as per se unreasonable under the antitrust laws.' 5 But while that result might be clear,
11. See text accompanying notes 106-11 infra.
12. Issues peculiar to club-imposed sanctions are considered separately. See text accompanying notes 112-116 infra.
13. See, e.g., Blalock v. Ladies Professional Golf Ass'n, 359 F. Supp. 1260, 1262 (N.D. Ga.
1973); Manok v. Southeast Dist. Bowling Ass'n, 306 F. Supp. 1215, 1218 (C.D. Cal. 1969);
Molinas v. National Basketball Ass'n, 190 F. Supp. 241, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
14. See, e.g., Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963), in which the Supreme
Court found that the collective action of the New York Stock Exchange and its members in
removing direct telephone connections between their office and a nonmember was a group
boycott. Id. at 347.
15. See, e.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959); Fashion
Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 467-68 (1941).
The per se rule is but one of two approaches used to evaluate existing competitive restraints. Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits "[e]very contract, combination . . . or
" 15 U.S.C. § 1
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States ....
(1970). Despite the breadth of this condemnation, the Supreme Court early concluded that
the language precludes only those contracts or combinations which unreasonably restrain
competition. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238-39, 241 (1918);
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59-60 (1911). The determination of reasonableness normally requires an exhaustive judicial investigation into the industry involved, including an examination of the evil believed to exist, the reasons for adopting the particular
restraint, the purpose or end sought to be attained, and the availability of less restrictive
alternatives. See, e.g., Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, supra at 238.
Antitrust litigation under the rule of reason approach is typically a laborious process requir-

1977]

PLAYER DISCIPLINE AND ANTITRUST LAWS

it would also be absurd. It would be a rather startling notion if the
antitrust laws meant that a business operation such as a league
could not protect itself against actions of participants which might
seriously injure, if not destroy, the enterprise. The success of most
professional sports activities depends upon the fans' belief that
games and matches represent honest competition. With the possible
exception of professional wrestling, the premise upon which the exhibitions are offered is that they represent a true test of the skills,
conditioning and coaching of the opposing sides. It is unlikely that
the interest of fans would continue at present levels if they had
reason to believe that the outcome of the competition was controlled
by factors other than the personal efforts of those participating and
the pre-established rules of the game."
Although the Supreme Court seemed to indicate at one time that
all concerted refusals to deal were per se illegal, 7 it subsequently
ing extensive pretrial discovery and review of documents, extensive fact gathering, and
lengthy presentations. The Supreme Court recognized the burden such litigation placed upon

the plaintiff seeking redress under the antitrust laws. In the Court's view, the extensive
economic inquiry often was unnecessary because prior cases had established that the particular practice ultimately would be found to be unreasonable. See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l. Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963). The Court's response was to announce that
some types of activities could be per se unreasonable:
[T]here are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious
effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively
presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as
to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use.
Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (emphasis supplied). Among
the practices the Court has deemed unlawful per se are price-fixing, United States v. SoconyVacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940); horizontal market divisions, United States v.
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 293 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); group
boycotts, Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 468 (1941); tying
arrangements, International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947).
16. The potential repercussions of player misconduct are illustrated rather starkly by the
Black Sox scandal of 1919 in which eight players confessed that they had accepted bribes to
throw the World Series. See generally E. ASINOF, EIGHT MEN OUT; THE BLACK Sox AND THE
1919 WORLD SERIES (1963). The event produced a considerable public outcry about the integrity of the game and threatened the existence of the league when three clubs threatened to
withdraw and join another association. See Davis, Self-Regulation in Baseball, 1909-71, in

349, 376-77 (R. Noll ed. 1974).
17. See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959). The Court
stated:
Group boycotts, or concerted refusals by traders to deal with other traders,
have long been held to be in the forbidden [per se] category. They have not
been saved by allegations that they were reasonable in the specific circumstances, nor by a failure to show that they "fixed or regulated prices, parcelled out
or limited production, or brought about a deterioration in quality."
Id. (footnote and citation omitted).
GOVERNMENT AND THE SPORTS BUSINESS,
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recognized that its pronouncements to this effect could not be applied literally. Particularly relevant in this connection is the Court's
decision in Silver v. New York Stock Exchange." The case arose
when the stock exchange attempted to prevent Silver, a nonmember, from gaining access to exchange transactions by means of
a private telephone connection with certain member firms. Silver
involves a number of issues which are relevant to our discussion of
discipline, but particularly pertinent for the immediate inquiry is
the Court's suggestion that the condemnation of concerted refusals
to deal under the antitrust statutes will not be applied where there
is a "justification derived from the policy of another statute or otherwise."'" Because the controversy in Silver focused on the question
of whether another statute - the Securities Exchange Act - provided a justification for the defendant's refusal to deal with the
plaintiff, 0 the case offers little indication of the types of facts which
might "otherwise" avoid summary condemnation under the per se
doctrine. Other courts, however, both before and after Silver, have
had occasion to address the question of the right of private groups
to engage in self-regulation. These courts have generally accepted
that there are certain types of group actions which cannot be adequately dealt with under the per se doctrine, but rather require a
more detailed inquiry into the reasonableness of the action taken.'
Among the groups entitled to this more deliberate treatment are
those engaged in activities of a nature which require self-policing of
standards of conduct and methods of competition.22
Sports enterprises would appear to present clear examples of
groups which need this authority for self-regulation. Not only are
rules necessary for the successful staging of competition,23 but in
18. 373 U.S. 341, 348-49, 361 (1963).
19. Id. at 348-49. See generally Comment, Trade Association Exclusionary Practices:An
Affirmative Role for the Rule of Reason, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1486 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
Trade Association].
20. 373 U.S. at 364.
21. See, e.g., Bridge Corp. of America v. American Contract Bridge League, Inc., 428 F.2d
1365, 1369 (9th Cir. 1970); Deesen v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n, 358 F.2d 165, 170, 172 (9th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 846 (1966); Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc.,
325 F. Supp. 1049, 1066 (C.D. Cal.), stay vacated sub nom. Haywood v. National Basketball
Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1971); STP Corp. v. United States Auto Club,
286 F. Supp. 146, 151 (S.D. Ind. 1968); Molinas v. National Basketball Ass'n, 190 F. Supp.
241, 243-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); United States v. United States Trotting Ass'n, 1960 Trade Cas.
69,761 (S.D. Ohio). But see Blalock v. Ladies Professional Golf Ass'n, 359 F. Supp. 1260,
1267 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
22. See Trade Association, supra note 19, at 1501-02.
23. The essence of "league competition" is the race for the league championship. For the
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addition, the groups have an interest in insuring that their ventures
remain free of illegal and fraudulent activities which might undermine fan support. Moreover, private regulation is necessary because
traditional public legal remedies - those secured through the criminal process or through civil actions - are typically inadequate.
Depending on the nature of the violation, such remedies either are
not available or afford a form of relief which does not provide sufficient protection of the group's interest in preserving the integrity of
the competition. For example, cheating under privately-defined
rules normally does not involve a violation of the public criminal
law, and there is no clear body of civil law doctrine which would
provide a complete remedy.2 4 Because such misconduct represents
a clear threat to the success of the private sports venture, it is
appropriate that the group which controls it be given authority to
take corrective action.
The recognition that sports authorities enjoy some discretion to
regulate the conduct of participants suggests that disciplinary actions normally will be reviewed under the rule of reason standard.25
The concept of per se illegality, however, will continue to play a
limited role. The prerogatives which a league enjoys can properly be
limited by the conditions which give rise to the need for selfregulation. 2 If the league uses its powers to achieve ends which
clearly cannot be justified by the need for preserving the integrity
of the sport, the per se doctrine should be applied. 27 Similarly, the
designation of "champion" to be meaningful, the teams must compete according to the same
rules so that comparison can be made. Thus, the league has an interest in defining such things
as the types of plays that will be permitted and the types of individual on-the-field conduct
that will be proscribed.
24. A number of theories might be proposed. Perhaps cheating could be viewed as a breach
of an implied term of the player's contract, or it might be seen as such an infringement upon
the economic position of the league as to warrant a court to exercise its equity powers. But
money damages are likely to be an ineffective remedy. They are likely to be speculative and,
moreover, would do little to satisfy the concern for fan reaction. Some form of injunction
might be devised to achieve the same purpose as a suspension, but a basic problem is that
there is no clearly defined existing body of law which would afford these rights. Moreover,
judicial procedures would be considerably more cumbersome than internal enforcement, a
fact which might well limit the effectiveness of the discipline.
25. See cases cited note 21 supra.
26. For a discussion explaining the rationale for moving some activities into the realm of
per se illegality see note 15 supra.
27. Such would be the case, for example, if a league used its disciplinary powers for anticompetitive purposes such as blacklisting athletes who played in rival associations. See, e.g.,
Washington State Bowling Proprietors Ass'n v. Pacific Lanes, Inc., 356 F.2d 371, 376 (9th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 963 (1966). For a further discussion of situations in which the
per se rule may be applied, see text accompanying notes 43-48 infra.

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18:703

procedural aspects of an otherwise proper disciplinary action may
be so lacking in fairness and objectivity as to warrant a summary
disapproval under the per se standard.28 But these will be extreme
cases, and most situations are likely to call for an inquiry under the
rule of reason test. Since this standard requires only a showing of
the reasonableness of the action taken, a league which acts responsibly in defining its disciplinable offenses and affords adequate procedural protections should find that the antitrust laws represent no
substantial intrusion into its efforts at self-regulation.
SELF-REGULATION: PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS OF
DISCIPLINE

ProceduralAspects of Discipline
There are two different elements of a league's disciplinary action
which might be called into question under the antitrust laws. The
first is a concern for the substantive aspect of the discipline: Was
the punished conduct a matter over which the league could properly
assume control, and was the league's sanction appropriate in light
of the interest which it sought to protect? A second and distinct
concern is whether the league followed reasonable procedures in
determining that a violation had occurred. The following discussion
treats these two issues separately and begins with a consideration
of procedural concerns. As will be seen, the sports area has produced
only a few cases which have specifically explored these questions."8
There are, however, other authorities, including the Silver case,
which deal with issues similar to those which will arise in the sports
context.3" A consideration of the general principles applicable to
private group discipline serves to identify the legal standard to be
applied in sports cases.
One might wonder how the antitrust statutes could be interpreted
to require procedural safeguards in private group disciplinary actions. Those laws are primarily concerned with practices which improperly limit competition and at least on the surface seem to have
little to say about procedural fairness. Since it is the fact of exclu28. See, e.g., Blalock v. Ladies Professional Golf Ass'n, 359 F. Supp. 1260, 1265-66 (N.D.
Ga. 1973). See also Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 364 (1963).
29. See, e.g., Blalock v. Ladies Professional Golf Ass'n, 359 F. Supp. 1260 (N.D. Ga. 1973);
Molinas v. National Basketball Ass'n, 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
30. See, e.g., Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963); Fashion Originators'
Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
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sion which limits competition for a participant's services, and not
the procedures which precede such a decision, it might appear that
the only relevant question was whether the conduct involved was
properly punishable. Under this view, it would be argued that the
antitrust laws authorize a court to look only at the propriety of the
end achieved and not at the means by which it was attained.
This is not the approach which has been taken, however. In
Silver,3 the Supreme Court made clear that the procedural aspects
of private self-regulation were an appropriate matter for inquiry by
the antitrust court. 2 The concern for procedural safeguards is supported by a number of considerations. It is thought that the requirement of notice and a hearing will facilitate the administration of the
antitrust laws. 3 Such procedures serve to define more precisely the
factual basis for the group's actions as well as the defenses and
contentions of the accused. Thus, a court called upon to review the
matter in an antitrust proceeding will be in a better position to
determine whether a basis exists for the discipline and whether the
action is justified in light of the group's purposes. 4 In addition, the
requirement that a group use reasonable and deliberate procedures
tends to discourage arbitrary action and thus serves to foster compliance with the substantive antitrust rules.3" If the group is required to state and defend its reasons for imposing the discipline,
it will constantly be reminded of the need to adopt defensible rules
and to apply them only when the proper factual basis exists.36 A
structured hearing will serve to expose weaknesses in the group's
position and is likely to encourage adjustments - such as a reduction in the offense charged or the punishment imposed - which will
bring its actions into antitrust compliance without the need for
litigation ."
Silver is particularly useful in defining the nature of the inquiry
a court should make into the question of procedural fairness. In one
portion of the opinion, the Court attempts to define the general type
of procedures to be followed. The Court stated that before selfregulation by private groups could be justified, there must be "some
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
Id. at 364.
See id. at 363.
See id. at 362-63.
See id. at 362.
See id.
See id. at 361-62.
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method of telling a protesting non-member why a rule is being invoked . . . and allowing him to reply in explanation of his position.""8 Thus, it would appear that the charges must be examined
in a specific proceeding designed for that purpose and the accused
must be given an opportunity to participate. While the Court did
not elaborate on how the proceeding should be structured, its concern for informing the accused and allowing him to respond implies
that there should be some type of advance notice, which would allow
the accused time to formulate his response and gather any pertinent
evidence. By the same token, the opportunity to offer an explanation presumably must be a meaningful one, which would mean that
it must precede the determination of guilt.
The Court in Silver also continued a role for the per se doctrine
in these matters. 9 The Court observed that the decision of the stock
exchange to terminate Silver's private line connection with member
firms had been made unilaterally without a statement of charges or
an opportunity for Silver to be heard. Under those circumstances,
the Court concluded, a finding of per se illegality was appropriate."
Thus, a disciplined athlete may be entitled to a summary finding
of illegality if he or she can establish that the method for determining guilt was inherently defective." In such a case the court need
not make a detailed inquiry into the basis of the discipline, its
justifications, or its effects. Before a defense on the merits will be
heard, the disciplining group must initially establish that its action
has the characteristics of reliability which come from a more deliberate proceeding in which the accused participated.4"
While Silver seems to indicate that notice and a hearing - or a
chance to explain - are necessary before drastic action can be
taken, numerous other questions may arise concerning the formalities which must accompany the decision-making of the disciplinary
authorities. Can the accused insist that he or she be represented by
counsel? Even if a representative is allowed, may attorneys be
excluded? Does the accused have a right to cross-examine
witnesses? Must a transcript, stenographic or otherwise, be
provided? Must the accused be given the right to participate in the
38. Id. at 361.
39. See id. at 365.
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., Blalock v. Ladies Professional Golf Ass'n, 359 F. Supp. 1260, 1265-66 (N.D.
Ga. 1973).
42. See generally Trade Association, supra note 19, at 1508-10.
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selection of the members of the tribunal hearing the case? What
rules of evidence will be followed? What standard of proof must be
applied to the determination of guilt: must guilt be shown beyond
a reasonable doubt, or only by reasonable evidence?
The existing case law has not developed to the point that specific
answers can be given to these questions. There are, however, several
considerations which should provide guidance. Because of the nature of the question raised, there is a temptation to view the matter
of procedural safeguards in constitutional terms and to look to cases
which define procedural due process in the areas of criminal and
administrative law. A comparison with these areas would not be
entirely inappropriate. The purposes of the requirement of a fair
hearing are similar, particularly where private self-regulation and
governmental administrative enforcement are compared. In each
instance, procedural fairness is required to insure the integrity of the
process, to facilitate subsequent judicial review, and to foster voluntary compliance with the legal mandate.43 But by the same token, it
would seem -inappropriate to view private group self-regulation in
purely constitutional terms. On some matters, the relevant constitutional provision specifies the protections to be afforded in greater
detail than is found in the antitrust area, where the requirement for
procedural safeguards is judge-made. In the criminal law, for example, limitations on evidence-gathering are specifically mandated
and reflect the particular needs of the areas to which they apply.
On a more general level, it should be noted that the nature of private
group decision-making is quite different from that found in cases
involving governmental action. For example, leagues normally do
not have, and should not be expected to maintain, the elaborate
permanent institutions for the investigation, prosecution, and review of violations which are found in the public sphere. Relatedly,
the private groups do not have available the option of broad-based
taxation to support these institutions, and it can be expected that
economic considerations will impose significant restraints.
Again, the point is not that notions of constitutional due process
should be ignored, but only that their application must be tempered
by the peculiar nature of the private decision-making which will be
reviewed under the antitrust laws. The central question concerns
which of the constitutional protections will be incorporated, and in
43. Compare McCormick, The Purpose of Due Process:FairHearingor Vehicle for Judicial
Review?, 52 TEx. L. REV. 1257 (1974), with text accompanying notes 31-37 supra.
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what form. In resolving this question, there are two considerations
which will deserve particular weight: the concern for the reliability
of the decision and the significance of the consequences to the individual. There is a high degree of interrelationship between these
factors; the more severe the consequences of a decision, the greater
the need for a carefully structured proceeding." When the accused
is threatened with a suspension or expulsion which seriously restricts his opportunity to earn a living, a high degree of deference
to his interests will be required.
As is implied in the above analysis, the extent of protection afforded will vary from case to case. The severity of the consequences
may be an important ingredient, and the range of relevant considerations will include such things as the complexity of the factual
issues and the sophistication of the accused. Because of the ad hoc
quality of the question, there is little value in attempting to anticipate all of the issues which might arise. A few examples, however,
will serve to illustrate the type of balancing which should be undertaken. For example, does the accused athlete have a right to be
represented by an attorney? The answer would seem to depend upon
a number of factors. If the enforcing agency -

the league -

con-

ducts its affairs through professional counsel and if the participant
has no particular sophistication on the matter of how to present his
defense, it would seem that the fairness of the proceeding could be
insured only if there were a balance in the relative professionalism
of the two sides. But if the disciplinary proceeding is handled by
non-legally trained personnel and otherwise has the attributes of
impartiality, a court should accept that some indivividuals can adequately represent themselves, particularly if the factual issues are
not overly complex.' 5 The primary concern should be whether the
disciplined athlete was seriously disadvantaged by the denial of
counsel, and that would seem to be a matter upon which no a priori
judgment could be made.
44. Cf., e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975); Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers
Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961). See generally Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing",
123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267 (1975).
45. Cf. Cornelio v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 243 F. Supp. 126 (E.D. Pa. 1965), aff'd, 358
F.2d 728 (3rd Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 975 (1967). In Cornelio the court rejected the
contention of a union member that his inability to be represented by "outside" counsel in a
proceeding before the union's trial committee resulted in a denial of procedural due process.

243 F. Supp. at 128. The court stated that "[dienial of assistance of counsel is of even less
significance as it bears upon the requirement of 'fair hearing' where, as here, the trial body
is made up of union members who, in all likelihood, will not be 'learned in the law."' Id. at
129 (footnote omitted).
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Another and perhaps more significant question arises as to the
rules of evidence and standard of proof which the league tribunal
must apply. On a general level, the private group should not be
expected to conform to the strict standards imposed in the criminal
area. The tribunals used in the sports area generally do not have the
sophistication of a court of law; and to expect them to operate with
the same care and precision as found in criminal proceedings would
require a fundamental restructuring which is not warranted in light
of the nature of the decision involved. A primary antitrust concern
is for the reliability of the decisions which are made. This can be
insured even if some hearsay evidence is presented, the traditional
notions of privileged testimony are ignored, and the decision is
made on the preponderance of the evidence. If the opportunities for
bias are removed and if there is an orderly presentation of evidence
bearing on a particular issue, there would seem to be no inherent
reason why the tribunal's decision should be suspect. But, of course,
this does not mean that a reviewing court should be unconcerned
about the quality of proof. If the tribunal ignores opportunities to
hear relevant testimony, admits considerable prejudicial evidence,
or fails to pursue important issues, the resulting decision is not
likely to be one which generates confidence and may properly be
rejected.
Reviewing courts should be particularly sensitive to the possibility of bias or prejudice in the decision-making process. There are
several attributes of the disciplinary systems in sports which suggest
that this may be a particular problem in this area. Disciplinary
decisions are often made by a commissioner or similar official who
is not totally removed from the internal politics of the league's venture." While it is inappropriate to conclude generally that league46. The league commissioner typically is selected by the club owners and is viewed as
dependent upon them. See generally Davis, supra note 16, at 377-82. The owners usually
determine and pay the commissioner's salary; they have authority to modify the documents
defining his powers, and they retain the right to fire him. Under these circumstances, it is
alleged the commissioner is not likely to render decisions contrary to the owners' basic inter-

ests. See generally Arbitration in ProfessionalAthletics in ARBITRATION
-

OF INTEREST DISPUTES

PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-SIXTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF

ARBITRATORS 109-13, 123 (remarks of Richard Moss, Counsel, Major League Baseball Players
Ass'n, and Edward Garvey, Executive Director, NFLPA) [hereinafter cited as Arbitration
in Professional Athletics].
In addition to their objection that the owners influence the commissioner's loyalities, the
players claim that the commissioner himself is so involved in matters that come before him
for arbitration that it is unrealistic to expect that he can treat them impartially. For example,
in addition to his role as arbitrator, the commissioner often is given power to promulgate rules
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appointed commissioners are inherently biased, there may be cases
in which the commissioner does not act with the appropriate objectivity.47 On another level, there may be a temptation by sports authorities to use players caught in rule infractions as scapegoats. For
example, if it develops that there are widespread rumors of gambling in a particular sport, there may be a tendency to "throw the
governing such subjects as player conduct and personnel procedures. See, e.g., CONSTITUTION
AND BY-LAWS FOR THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE (1972), which provides that: "The Commissioner shall interpret and from time to time establish policy and procedure in respect to the
provisions of the Constitution and By-Laws and any enforcement thereof." Id. at § 8.5. He
may be required to arbitrate a case in which the meaning of the rule or his authority to
promulgate it is called into question. As a result, the players contend that the commissioner
cannot be expected to remain objective when his own actions are under review. See Arbitration in ProfessionalAthletics, supra at 123 (remarks of Edward Garvey, Executive Director,
NFLPA). In other situations the commissioner is empowered to rule upon player complaints
concerning disciplinary actions that he himself has taken. See id. at 125. See also discussion
in National Football League Players Ass'n v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 12, 14 (8th Cir. 1974).
47. An analysis of the commissioner's role will indicate that his relationship to the owner
presents a different legal issue than is suggested by the fact that he performs the dual
functions of administrator and arbitrator. With respect to the former, the basic question is
whether the owners' control over the commissioner's salary, position, and powers results in
the sort of partiality which will invalidate an arbitrator's actions. There is no doubt that a
finding of partiality will permit a court to vacate an arbitrator's award. This was true at
common law, see generally M. DOMKE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
§§ 21.02-.03 (1968); Annot., 65 A.L.R.2d 755, 759-61 (1959), and is true under the United
States Arbitration Act, which specifically identifies "evident partiality" as a ground for
denying the enforceability of an award. 9 U.S.C. § 10(b) (1970). The meaning of partiality,
however, is tempered by the realities of commercial arbitration. Unlike judges, arbitrators
are not expected to remain aloof from the transactions giving rise to the disputes presented
to them. Indeed, arbitrators often are chosen specifically for their experience and expertise
in the particular field, and these qualities often exist because the arbitrator is employed in
the relevant industry. See Commonwealth Coating Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S.
145, 150 (1968) (White, J., concurring). Thus, it is clear that neither the arbitrator's friendship with one of the parties, see Kentucky River Mills v. Jackson, 206 F.2d 111, 117 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953), nor his prior or subsequent business dealings, see, e.g.,
Sanko S.S. Co. v. Cook Indus., Inc., 495 F.2d 1260, 1263-64 (2d Cir. 1973), will necessarily
provide a basis for disqualification. See generally M. DOMKE, supra, at § 21.02. Moreover, it
would seem that there is nothing inherently improper about a system in which one party pays
the arbitrator's salary as long as the decisions reached are otherwise fair. See generally id. at
§ 42.01. Despite the player's resistance, the fairness of the commissioner must be judged,
therefore, on a basis other than the source of his compensation. Finally, although the owners
do control the commissioner's power and tenure, consideration must be given to the provisions
of the league by-laws protecting the commissioner from removal by a small number of owners.
See, e.g., CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS FOR THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE §§ 8.1(b) 7 (c)
(1972) (modification of Commissioner Rozelle's contract requires the affirmative vote of 2/3
of the league members as well as approval by 12 of the 15 clubs which were members of the
league in 1966). Thus, particularly with respect to matters affecting only a single club, the
commissioner may be insulated from vindictiveness on the part of a club owner. For an
interesting debate between owners' and players' representatives on the problems of a commissioner form of self-government, see Arbitration in Professional Athletics, supra note 46.
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book" at the first player to be caught.48 Such action will give the
appearance to the public that the problem has been eliminated and
serve as a pointed reminder to other participants who might be
involved. Because of the need for swift, forceful action in these
cases, there is a risk that the guilt of those who are accused will be
determined summarily or that the degree of the offense will be overstated.
Courts have dealt with the risk of bias in other situations involving private discipline.4 9 Those cases suggest that courts should be
alert to the fact that a group's procedures may not provide mechanisms to guard against the possibility of prejudice. If there is evidence that the decision-maker has made up his mind before the
hearing or that there have been improper attempts by club owners
to influence the proceedings, it is fully appropriate that the results
not be accepted. Because of their more disinterested perspective,
the courts are particularly well-suited to provide a buffer against
overzealous action by league authorities anxious to rid themseves of
a brewing scandal.
A somewhat different aspect of the concern for bias was treated
in Blalock v. Ladies Professional Golf Association.5" Jane Blalock
was accused of cheating in an LPGA sponsored tournament and
upon being found guilty was suspended from tournament play for a
year. She sued, alleging that the suspension constituted a group
boycott.5 The court accepted the plaintiff's characterization and
found the defendant's action to be per se illegal.2 The court's opinion can be read as presenting the highly debatable conclusion that
Silver permits private self-regulation only when it is supported by
specific statutory authorization.53 But that aspect of the case aside,
48. See, e.g., Molinas v. National Basketball Ass'n, 190 F. Supp. 241, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
49. See, e.g., Falcone v. Dantinne, 420 F.2d 1157 (3d Cir. 1969); Cefalo v. Moffett, 78
LRRM 2112 (D.D.C. 1971).
50. 359 F. Supp. 1260 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
51. Id. at 1263.
52. Id. at 1265-66.
53. Id. at 1266-67. The district court noted that in Silver, the Supreme Court had said that
self-regulation might be appropriate if justified by "'another statute [other than the antitrust statutes] or otherwise.'" Id. at 1266, quoting 373 U.S. at 348-49. The court also recognized that other courts had indicated that the structure of certain industries might present
cases in which the justification for self-regulation arose "otherwise" than from a statute. 359
F. Supp. at 1267. Judge Moye, however, chose to give a more limited reading to the Supreme
Court's inclusion of the "or otherwise" language:
The question posed in Silver was whether the existence of a statutory framework for self-government in the [securities] industry repealed the antitrust
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the court reaches a sensible result and suggests an independent
rationale. The court was primarily concerned about the structure of
the disciplinary organ in the LPGA. The committee which imposed
the suspension was composed of golfers who competed with Blalock
on the LPGA circuit. Moreover, in the court's view, the group was
given "completely unfettered, subjective" discretion in determining
the appropriateness of exclusion as the sanction for the alleged offense. 4 Although the court did not dwell on the question of how this
discretion might be affected by bias, it clearly was concerned about
the fact that the decision was made by players who stood to gain if
Blalock were removed as a competitor. In the court's view, this
situation had the essential characteristics of Fashion Originators'
5 where one group
Guild of America v. FTC,"
attempted to regulate
practices in the trade for the purpose of eliminating a potential
source of competition.57

laws to that extent. The Supreme Court stated that "This means that any
repealer of the antitrust laws must be discerned as a matter of implication, and
'[iut is a cardinal principle of construction that repeals by implication are not
favored.' " . . . A fortiorari, a private, nonstatutory rule to govern a private
association cannot repeal by implication a federal statute, the "law of the land."
Id. (citation omitted).
The primary difficulty with the court's analysis is that it would lead to the logical conclusion that a sports association has no authority to discipline participants, even those engaging
in conduct, such as bribery and cheating, which threatened the league's very existence. The
court did temper its analysis, however, by an approving reference to Molinas v. National
Basketball Association, 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), in which a lifetime suspension was
sustained under the antitrust laws. 359 F. Supp. at 1267. The court distinguished Molinas
because the punishment in that case was not imposed by the athlete's competitors, which
suggests that the per se rule in Blalock may be limited to those situations.
A more correct reading of Silver would still have allowed the district court to apply the
per se rule on the facts of Blalock. The court could have recognized that private groups enjoy
some discretion to impose discipline and that normally the exercise of this right will be
treated under the rule of reason. As Silver clearly indicates, however, per se illegality will be
found if the group fails to afford procedural safeguards to the accused. See text accompanying
notes 39-40 supra. Because Blalock's discipline was imposed by competitors who might have
gained by her exclusion from the sport, 359 F. Supp. at 1265, it was questionable whether
the proceeding had the requisite procedural fairness.
54. 359 F. Supp. at 1268.
55. Id. at 1265.
56. 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
57. 359 F. Supp. at 1267-68. In Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S.
457 (1941), the petitioners included manufacturers and designers of original dress designs who
conspired to discourage other manufacturers from copying or pirating the unpatented designs
and selling them at lower prices. The device chosen was a secondary boycott in which the
Guild members refused to sell their products to retailers who also purchased the cheaper
copies. The Guild argued that the pirating by other manufacturers was tortious under state
law and that the resulting boycott was thus undertaken for a proper purpose. Id. at 461, 467.
The Court upheld the FTC's refusal to hear this evidence. Id. at 468. In the Court's view "the
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It should be noted that the court did not find that any of the
players on the discipline committee was actually biased. Rather, the
central objection was that the disciplinary process had not been
structured to guard against this possibility. 5 This result seems consistent with the teachings of Silver, in which the Court did not
inquire into the correctness of the group's decision, but rather into
the fairness of the procedures under which the action was taken."
Thus, it will not always be necessary for the plaintiff to directly
attack the integrity of particular members of the disciplinary tribunal, a tactic which would likely lead to unwanted repercussions.
Some cases will provide the occasion for a less personalized criticism
of the imperfections in the structure of the disciplinary mechanism.
Although Blalock dealt with a sport involving individualized competition, the case may have interesting implications in the league
sports context. A criticism often raised in the major team sports is
that the league commissioner, who is usually hired and paid by the
club owners, is given sole discretion to administer the disciplinary
system. 0 One logical reform would be to restructure the disciplinary
tribunal to include representatives of the players. An obvious question arises as to whether Blalock would permit this type of arrangement, since it might be argued that the player representatives from
opposing teams are competitors of those who would be disciplined
and thus their decision-making might be guided by improper considerations. It might be asserted that the decision-makers would be
tempted to eliminate the accused in order to decrease his team's
chance of winning the championship and securing the resulting rewards. There are, however, some weaknesses in the use of Blalock
in this setting. Because competitive success depends upon a team,
rather than a purely individual effort, it is less clear that a player
decision-maker would gain any significant advantage from the exreasonableness of the methods pursued by the combination to accomplish its unlawful object
isno more material than would be the reasonableness of the prices fixed by unlawful combination." Id. The Court suggested that the Guild should have pursued its state law remedies
directly and not undertaken its own method of extra-judicial enforcement. Id. at 465, 468.

The vices which the Court identified in the Guild's arrangement were similar to those attributable to player restraints: the arrangement "narrowed the outlets" through which the affected parties could trade; it subjected non-complying parties to a boycott; and it "takes away
the freedom of action" of members of the combination in the operation of their businesses.
Id. at 465.
58. 359 F. Supp. at 1268. See text accompanying note 56 supra.
59. 373 U.S. at 364-66. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
60. See Arbitration in ProfessionalAthletics, supra note 46.
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clusion of a single participant. Moreover, because the players are
salaried and generally receive game-by-game compensation only in
championship contests, the economic rewards of an improper exclusion are more speculative and for that reason represent a less certain
risk.
Although its applicability is somewhat debatable, the Blalock
decision should have the desirable effect of prompting the parties
to consider alternatives other than direct participation for increasing player inputs into the disciplinary system. One approach might
give the players a voice in the selection of an independent party who
would be given authority over disciplinary matters. A less venturesome alternative would permit the players to participate in redrafting the rules defining punishable conduct for the purpose of limiting
the discretion afforded the administering authority. A consideration
of other techniques which are available should serve to underscore
the fact that direct player participation is not an indispensible element in a fair disciplinary system and, indeed, may not be a desirable feature.
Substantive Aspects of Discipline
Once it is accepted that leagues have authority to maintain a
system for internal discipline, a question arises as to how broadly it
may extend its regulatory authority. Unless some legal control is
introduced, there is a risk that the disciplinary power may be used
to achieve improper economic goals or to require conformity with a
standard of morality which reflects more the idiosyncrasies of a
commissioner or a group of owners than the needs of the sport.
Although some have concluded that the antitrust laws are not a
particularly useful vehicle for controlling a league's abuse of its
disciplinary power,6 ' a review of the relevant doctrine does suggest
a standard which could serve as an effective control. The courts
have had few occasions to consider how antitrust principles, with
their basically commercial orientation, should be adjusted to deal
with the concern for ethics and morality which will arise in the
disciplinary context.2 But it would appear that the goal of a legal
61. See, e.g., Discipline in Sports, supra note 1, at 779-80.
62. See, e.g., Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (copying
dress designs); Blalock v. Ladies Professional Golf Ass'n, 359 F. Supp. 1260 (N.D. Ga. 1973)
(cheating); Manok v. Southeast Dist. Bowling Ass'n, 306 F. Supp. 1215 (C.D. Cal. 1969)
(failure to report cheating); Molinas v. National Basketball Ass'n, 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y.
1961) (gambling).
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restraint upon the disciplinary power of a sports enterprise bears a
close affinity to the basic policy of the antitrust laws. In each instance, there is a concern for protecting an individual from undue
restraints upon his competitive opportunities. Thus, it is not surprising that principles which were developed in a purely economic
setting can be adapted to answer questions which, to some extent,
involve matters of ethics.
Some of the limits on a league's disciplinary prerogatives can be
stated rather easily. For example, there should be little debate that
a sports authority cannot use its disciplinary power solely to enhance its economic position or to restrict the competitive opportunities of a player. 3 Thus, it would not be permissible for a league
to impose sanctions on players who entered into negotiations for
future employment with a rival league. Equally suspect are cases in
which a league blacklisted a player who abandoned his or her contract to play in a competing league. 4 While the athlete's conduct
might amount to a breach of an existing contract, there are independent legal actions through which the injured club can seek relief, 5
63. Cf., e.g., Trade Association, supra note 19, at 1502-03.
64. See Note, The Super Bowl and the Sherman Act: Professional Team Sports and the
Antitrust Laws, 81 HARV. L. REV. 418, 425-26 (1967); Note, The Balance of Power in Professional Sports, 22 MAINE L. REv. 459, 465-67 (1970); cf. Radovich v. National Football League,
352 U.S. 445, 448 (1957); Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402, 410 (2d Cir. 1949) (Frank, J.).
See also Washington State Bowling Proprietors Ass'n v. Pacific Lanes, Inc., 356 F.2d 371 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 963 (1966), in which the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held that a bowling association's rules disqualifying from tournament competition those
bowlers who competitively bowled in nonmember bowling establishments constituted a boycott that was illegal per se. Id. at 376.
65. If an athlete undertakes to play for another club in breach of an existing contract, the
original employer might pursue at least two different causes of action. It might bring an action
against the athlete to enforce the athlete's promise to play exclusively for it, a covenant found
in most standard player contracts. The remedy available in such a suit is somewhat unusual.
The plaintiff club usually will not receive money damages because the player's services often
will be found to be unique, thus precluding a calculation of his market value. Similarly, for
reasons of public policy, courts have refused to grant specific performance and therefore they
will not order the athlete to play for his original employer. Rather, the remedy afforded is
typically a negative injunction which enjoins the defendant from playing for any other club.
See, e.g., Washington Capitols Basketball Club, Inc. v. Barry, 419 F.2d 472 (9th Cir. 1969);
Central New York Basketball, Inc. v. Barnett, 181 N.E.2d 506, 517 (Ct. C.P. Cuyahoga
County, Ohio 1961); Philadelphia Ball Club v. Lajoie, 202 Pa. 210, 51 A. 973 (1902); Matuszak
v. Houston Oilers, Inc., 515 S.W.2d 725 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974). See generally Brennan,
Injunction Against Professional Athletes Breaching Their Contracts, 34 BROOKLYN L. Rv. 61
(1967); Gilbert, Some Old Problems in a Modern Guise, 4 CALIF. L. REv. 114 (1916); Comment, Injunctions in Professional Athletes' Contracts - An Overused Remedy, 43 CONN. B.J.
538 (1969).
The original employer may also have a separate cause of action against the club that hired
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and the additional sanction of perpetual disbarment from the original league would seem to serve no legitimate purpose.
In the examples given, the disciplinary action has the same aspect
of coercive use of market power which has been condemned in other
settings,66 and the mere fact that a sports venture is involved should
not change the analysis. The cases from other areas also suggest that
such actions will be treated as per se illegal" and thus the court need
not entertain evidence which the league might offer in justification.
While the more detailed inquiry required by the rule of reason will
be appropriate in most group discipline situations, the present cases
involve actions so clearly directed to anti-competitive ends that
they are appropriately treated as naked restraints of trade for which
there is no justification.
The issues of necessity and justification require more attention
when the focus is shifted from discipline undertaken for purely anticompetitive reasons to that which is imposed to preserve the integrity of on-the-field competition." As previously noted, the league
has an interest in protecting its ventures against those who violate
important playing rules, engage in gambling activities, or otherwise
undermine the appearance that the league's contests involve honest
athletic competition. 9 The difficulty is that the league's concern for
protecting its public image can easily be corrupted into rules which
regulate player conduct having little connection with what occurs
on the field. There is a real risk that the definition of proper conduct
will be drawn so narrowly as to infringe upon the political, religious,
or social prerogatives of the players. Moreover, the problem of
achieving an appropriate balance between the corporate interest
and that of the players is complicated in no small measure by the
fact that non-conforming behavior tends to attract the interest of
the sports news media. Private actions of employees which would
go unnoticed in other industries may appear as lead stories on the
the breaching player. The theory of this action would be that the "hiring away" amounted

to a tortious interference with an existing contract. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS § 129 (4th ed. 1971). Because there are few precedents in the sports area,
the precise contours of this action are somewhat uncertain. See, e.g., American League
Baseball Club, Inc. v. Pasquel, 187 Misc. 230, 63 N.Y.S.2d 537 (Sup. Ct. 1946); World
Football League v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Inc., 513 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
66. See, e.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion
Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
67. For a discussion of the application of the per se rule, see note 15 supra.
68. See generally Trade Association, supra note 19, at 1493-97, 1504-10.

69. See notes 13-16 supra & accompanying text.
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sports pages. Such coverage tends to blur the distinction between
the player's public and private affairs and may prompt league authorities to assume that most aspects of an individual's off-the-field
conduct are appropriate subjects for control."
The developing body of law dealing with the regulatory powers of
private groups suggests the general standard which should be applied to define the range of the league's authority in controlling
player conduct. It will be recalled that the courts seem to be prepared to permit private group regulation where such internal control
is justified by the structure of the industry or the nature of the
activity undertaken. 7 ' While the latter concerns identify the reasons
for granting private regulatory powers, they also serve as a limitation on the prerogatives which may be assumed.7 2 Thus, the group,
in this case the league, should be permitted only that range of control which can be justified by the special needs of its peculiar venture. In determining whether particular disciplinary action bears
the necessary relationship to the concerns which support selfregulation, the rule of reason will be applied, except, of course,
where the action so clearly reflects an anti-competitive motive as to
call for treatment under the per se doctrine.73 Thus, for most rules
related to the integrity of league competition, the relevant inquiry
is whether the action is reasonable in light of the goals sought to be
achieved, on the one hand, and the effect upon the players' competitive opportunities on the other.74 In making this determination, it
70. The relationship between sports and the news media is an interesting one; few other
private commercial activities receive as much free "advertising." Indeed, extensive news
coverage has been an important ingredient in the economic success of modern sports. See
generally J. MICHENER, SPoRTs IN AMERICA 285-336 (1976).
71. See text accompanying notes 21-24 supra.
72. See generally Bridge Corp. of America v. American Contract Bridge League, Inc., 428
F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1970); Barber, Refusals to Deal Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 103
U. PA. L. REV. 847 (1955); Trade Associations, supra note 19.
73. See authorities cited note 72 supra; accord, STP Corp. v. United States Auto Club,
286 F. Supp. 146 (S.D. Ind. 1968); Molinas v. National Basketball Ass'n, 190 F. Supp. 241
(S.D.N.Y. 1961); United States v. United States Trotting Ass'n, 1960 Trade Cas. 69,761
(S.D. Ohio).
74. It should be noted that the Supreme Court has declined to decide whether the appropriate standard of review is one of reasonableness. In Silver, the Court noted that because it
had decided the case on procedural grounds
there is also no need for us to define further whether the interposing of a substantive justification in an antitrust suit brought to challenge a particular enforcement of the rules on its merits is to be governed by a standard of arbitrariness,
good faith, reasonableness, or some other measure. It will be time enough to deal
with that problem if and when the occasion arises.
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is appropriate for the court to consider evidence on a wide range of
matters, including the prior experiences of the league,75 practices of
leagues in other sports,7 6 the quality of the deliberations which preceded the definition of the offense, informed testimony on fan and
player reaction to similar conduct, the availability of less restrictive
controls," and, not least of all, the severity of the impact of the rule
upon those who are disciplined. It must be accepted that many
points which will be called into controversy will not admit of certain
proof. There are no clear answers as to how personal freedoms are
to be valued when balanced against the organization's concern for
fan reaction. However, legal institutions have considerable experience in making similar judgments on matters of personal liberties,
and many of the issues likely to appear will not be wholly foreign
to the judicial forum.
The role to be fulfilled by the general standard identified above
becomes more clear when specific types of misconduct are considered. Gambling by players has been a source of considerable concern
for sports leagues. 5 Especially apt to attract disciplinary action are
cases in which a player bets on the outcome of games in which he
participates." An application of the reasonableness test is likely to
create a standard of review that weighs in favor of sustaining the
373 U.S. at 365-66. Most of the lower courts, however, have implied that a reasonableness
standard provides an appropriate criteria for review. See cases cited in note 21, supra.
75. In sustaining the suspension of a player for gambling in Molinas v. National Basketball
Ass'n, 190 F. Supp. 241, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), the court emphasized that the league had
experienced difficulties as a result of persistent rumors concerning betting activities.
76. The practices of other leagues may not always be a useful guide. For example, some
leagues, particularly the hockey leagues, are willing to tolerate more violence than would be
accepted elsewhere. See generally Kennedy, Wanted: An End to Mayhem, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, Nov. 17, 1975, at 17; Smith, Good Unclean Fun for All, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9,
1975, § 5, at 3, col. 6; Fachet, NHL Bloodbath Sparks Spate of Empty Rhetoric, Washington
Post, Apr. 21, 1976, at El, col. 1; Winnipeg Free Press, Mar. 20, 1976, at 72, col. 1.
77. There is a growing body of literature on the issue of whether the antitrust laws require
an entity to utilize only the "least restrictive" means of control or whether a broader range
of discretion is afforded. See, e.g., Robinson, Recent Antitrust Developments: 1975, 76 COLUM.
L. REV. 191, 231-35 (1976). See also American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d
1230, 1248-50 (3d Cir. 1975).
78. See generally J. MICHENER, SPORTS IN AMERICA 406-13 (1976); Discipline in Sports,
supra note 1, at 772-79; N.Y. Times, June 27, 1976, § 5, at 9, col. 6 (review of controversial
survey made for Commission on the Review of the National Policy Toward Gambling);
Washington Post, June 25, 1976, at D1, col. 2 (national gambling report); N.Y. Times, Dec.
10, 1975, at 35, col. 1 (New York Jets' Steve Tannen cleared of bookmaking involvement).
79. See Molinas v. National Basketball Ass'n, 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Molinas
v. Podoloff, 133 N.Y.S.2d 743 (Sup. Ct. 1954). For an account of lifetime suspensions meted
out against two hockey players accused of wagering on their clubs, see R. BEDDOEs, S. FisCHLER, & I. GITLER, HOCKEY! THE STORY OF THE WORLD'S FASTEST SPORT 268-70 (1969).
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league's efforts to control such conduct. For example, it is readily
apparent that gambling falls within the category of activities which
justify regulation. The league has a strong interest in insuring that
its contests are solely tests of athletic skill and are not influenced
by the desire of some participants to have the team perform better
or worse than the odds-makers have predicted."0 The player-betting
cases typically involve few delicate questions of personal liberty.
Betting is illegal in most states, and this fact is usually well-known
to the players. Moreover, the athlete is hired specifically to contribute his talents to the club's, and hence the league's, effort, and it
can reasonably be implied that he will do nothing which suggests
that his on-the-field performance had any other purpose.
A case which suggests that the courts will be willing to sustain
league discipline in these instances is Molinas v. National Basketball Association."' Molinas, a player for the NBA Fort Wayne Pistons, admitted that he had placed several bets on his team to win
particular games. The league had a specific prohibition on gambling, and pursuant to those rules, the NBA commissioner declared
that Molinas was suspended indefinitely. The player applied for
reinstatement on several occasions, but his request was denied each
time. Molinas eventually sued, alleging that the league's suspension
and the subsequent denials of reinstatement amounted to unreasonable restraints on trade under the antitrust laws." The court rejected this contention. Its treatment of the issue indicated a willingness to afford sports leagues considerable deference in their efforts
to minimize the influences of gambling:
A rule, and a corresponding contract clause, providing for the
suspension of those who place wagers on games in which they are
participating seems not only reasonable, but necessary for the
survival of the league. Every league or association must have
some reasonable governing rules, and these rules must necessarily
80. See note 16 supra & accompanying text. There are a number of indications suggesting
that the leagues regard gambling as a serious threat. One is the harsh penalties meted out to
those suspected of gambling. See, e.g., Molinas v. National Basketball Ass'n, 190 F. Supp.
241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (indefinite suspension); Discipline in Sports, supra note 1, at 777 n.30,
778 n.31. Moreover, on occasion, leagues have attempted to block efforts to legalize gambling.
In 1976, the NFL was denied a temporary restraining order that would have barred the state
of Delaware from beginning operation of a pro football lottery. See Washington Post, Aug.
28, 1976, at El, col. 5.
81. 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). See also Molinas v. Podoloff, 133 N.Y.S.2d 743
(1954).
82. 190 F. Supp. at 243.
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include disciplinary provisions. Surely, every disciplinary rule
which a league may invoke, although by its nature it may involve
some sort of a restraint, does not run afoul of the antitrust laws.
And a disciplinary rule invoked against gambling seems about as
reasonable a rule as could be imagined.83

Not all gambling cases will admit of such an easy resolution.
There is a variety of conduct other than betting which a league may
attempt to punish, and where a player's involvement with the gambling establishment is more attenuated, the range of the league's
prerogatives will be more limited. At this juncture, it may be useful
to point out that the relevant antitrust doctrine serves not only to
limit the types of conduct which can be punished, but also to control
the sanctions which can be imposed. Again, the basic standard is
one of reasonableness,84 and it is appropriate to ask whether the
particular punishment can be justified in light of the league's interest in controlling the disputed conduct. 8 While less serious gambling offenses might support some form of disciplinary action, they
may not justify the most serious sanction of perpetual suspension.
The Molinas court specifically approved the NBA lifetime suspension of the plaintiff in that case, but that holding should be read
in light of the facts which established that the athlete had directly
and knowingly involved himself with the gambling process."8 The
83. Id. at 243-44. For a brief account of Molinas's later involvement in other types of
gambling activities connected with sports and his other questionable dealings, see N.Y.
Times, Aug. 6, 1975, at 18, col. 1.
84. As noted earlier, the question of the appropriate standard of review is not entirely free
from debate, although the trend of authority supports the reasonableness test. See note 74
supra.
85. Although no sports cases can be found in which a court refused to approve a penalty
as being too harsh in light of the infraction involved, the notion that the sanctions used must
be reasonable can be inferred from the general principle that a league can use its disciplinary
power only to achieve legitimate goals of self-regulation. See text accompanying notes 63-67
supra. The imposition of long-term suspensions for relatively minor infractions is the sort of
coercive action the antitrust laws are intended to guard against. Cf. Trade Association, supra
note 19, at 1506-08.
86. 190 F. Supp. at 244. In responding to Molinas's objection to the length of his suspension, the court stated:
The same factors justifying the suspension also serve to justify the subsequent
refusal to reinstate. The league could reasonably conclude that in order . . . to
restore and maintain the confidence of the public vital to its existence, it was
necessary to enforce its rules strictly, and to apply the most stringent sanctions.
One can certainly understand the reluctance to permit an admitted gambler to
return to the league, and again to participate in championship games, especially
in light of the aura and stigma of gambling which has clouded the sports world
in the past few years. Viewed in this context, it can be seen that the league was
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case actually lends support to the notion that differentiated punishments are required, for the court selects as its frame of reference the
question of whether the league's actions were reasonable. 7 Presumably, the requirement of reasonableness would require a different
sanction in a case, for example, in which the player's only offense
was that he had secured information about the predicted point
spread for particular games. There are few legitimate uses for such
data, and the league would be justified in taking steps to prevent
the player's involvement even to this limited extent. But the conduct would not warrant the league's permanent termination of the
player's career, particularly if its investigation failed to establish a
more substantial connection between the player and the gambling
elements. A fine or probation would be sufficient to stop the misconduct, deter others, and satisfy the public of the seriousness of the
league's purposes.
A similar analysis would apply when the focus is shifted to other
types of misconduct. Infractions which involve violations of the
rules of competition are particularly appropriate subjects for a differentiated treatment. Some forms of cheating directly affect the
integrity of the game. The use of unapproved equipment or improperly advancing the ball, when done with an intent to deceive, are
justified in determining that it was absolutely necessary to avoid even the slightest connection with gambling, gamblers, and those who had done business with
gamblers, in the future.
190 F. Supp. at 244.
Perhaps the most debatable portion of the court's analysis was its observation, offered in
further justification of the permanent suspension, that "conduct reasonable in its inception
certainly does not become unreasonable through the mere passage of time, especially when
the same factors making the conduct reasonable in the first instance, are still present." Id.
But cf. United States v. Jerrold Elec. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 558 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd
mem., 365 U.S. 567 (1961). Although it may be reasonable to impose an indefinite suspension
initially, a player subsequently may engage in activities that serve to establish his integrity
and thus cleanse his public image. For example, the athlete may play in another league,
assume some position of public responsibility, or undertake to express convincingly his regret
for his earlier misconduct. When the player has been able to improve his reputation, it would
be inappropriate to justify a continuing suspension on the ground that the action was
"reasonable in the first instance." It should be noted, however, that the Molinas court suggested that the plaintiff there hal not shQwn an improvement in his reputation sufficient to
make unreasonable the league's refusal to reinstate him as a player. Id. Molinas's subsequent
difficulties with the law and with gambling indicate that his may have not been a good case
for testing the point made here. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1975, at 18, col. 1.
87. For example, the court observed that "plaintiff must show much more than he has here
in order to compel a conclusion that the defendant's conduct was in fact unreasonable. Thus,
it is clear, that the refusal to reinstate the plaintiff does not rise to the stature of a violation
of the antitrust laws." 190 F. Supp. at 244.
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destructive of the sports organization's effort to avoid fan disgust
and cynicism and, therefore, warrant harsh treatment. Alternatively, other misconduct, including some which is intentional, may
not justify any greater penalties than those which are imposed in the
context of the competition itself. For example, offensive holding in
football and intentional fouls in basketball normally only require
action by the game officials. 8 On matters of this sort, one must often
look to the community ethics within the sport to determine how the
varieties of "cheating" should be viewed. While an absolutist would
find it difficult to rank various forms of dishonesty, it seems clear
that differentiations can be made. The factors to be considered
include the degree of deception involved; the motive with which it
is practiced, including the immediacy of any economic gain; the risk
of physical injury to others; and the degree of community tolerance.
Fighting among players, although it does not involve the type of
dishonesty found in other rule infractions, is often a source of concern for league officials." There have been numerous instances in
which fighting and other activity which threatens the safety of participants have resulted in players being suspended from competition, although the suspensions are usually for short periods of time."
There should be little doubt that the league can take action to
control such conduct. 9 It has a legitimate concern not only for the
88. If particular types of rule violations become too disruptive, however, the league may
find it necessary to add a penalty in addition to that imposed by game officials. Thus, when
technical fouls became a problem in the NBA, the league imposed an additional automatic
fine. This escalation of the penalty apparently had the desired effect, for the number of
technical fouls decreased in subsequent years. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1975, at 31, col. 1.
89. Not all leagues share the same concern for violence in their respective sports. The NHL
has been criticized for its failure to take more forceful action to stem the recent escalation of
assaults and fighting in that sport. See sources cited in note 77 supra. Other leagues, by using
sanctions ranging from fines to suspensions, have taken stronger positions against violence.
See sources cited in note 91 infra. Cf. National Football League Players Ass'n v. NLRB, 503
F.2d 12 (8th Cir. 1974).
90. See, e.g., Globe & Mail (Toronto), Dec. 5,1975, at 33, col. 6 (hockey player Phil Roberto
suspended pending league review of incident involving spearing opposing player in throat);
Gazette (Montreal), Jan. 30, 1976, at 24, col. 5 (hockey player Dave Schultz given two game
suspension for butting opposing player); Washington Post, Feb. 4, 1976, at D6, col. 5 (hockey
player Dave Hutchison suspended for eight games without pay for spearing at head of opposing player); N.Y. Times, April 23, 1976, at 43, col. 3 (baseball pitcher Lynn McGlothen
suspended five days for throwing beanball). See also Minneapolis Tribune, Aug. 12, 1975, at
2B, col. 3 (NHL players-owners council requests rule automatically suspending player who
deliberately attempts to injure an opponent).
91. Although there can be little question that the league has an interest in preventing fights
and violence among players, some might question whether league control is necessary in view
of the public remedies available through the criminal laws. It might be argued that the
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physical well-being of its players but also for the problems which
might result if a brawl developed to the point where fans joined in.
Finally, major altercations among players disrupt the contests in
which they occur and tend to attract attention away from the regular competition, a result which undermines the league's efforts to
focus fan attention on the game itself. That the league may be
justified in controlling such unauthorized combat does not mean
that its action will not be reviewed. As with other types of misconleagues should defer to the more neutral policies of the criminal authorities. A closer analysis,
however, suggests that separate league enforcement is desirable. Public prosecutors generally
have been reluctant to prosecute for assaults arising out of athletic competition, and, as a
result, there have been few prosecutions in the past. Although the level of public law enforcement has increased markedly in response to the recent rise in violence in hockey, some remain
critical of this use of the criminal law. See Kennedy, Wanted: An End to Mayhem, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, Nov. 17, 1975, at 17 (some public prosecutors demand more criminal enforcement; league officials question necessity); Globe & Mail (Toronto), Apr. 26, 1976, at 52, col.
6 (survey of 30 criminal actions taken in hockey-related violence at professional and amateur
levels); Winnipeg Free Press, Apr. 21, 1976, at 69, col. 8 (Philadelphia district attorney terms
prosecution of three Philadelphia players a "perversion of office" by Canadian officials); id.,
Apr. 22, 1976, at 74, col. 2 (Ontario Attorney General responds to criticism of his prosecution
of Philadelphia players). The difficulty of obtaining convictions further diminishes the practicability of a league's reliance solely on criminal enforcement. Not only is the legal standard
unclear, but also there appears to be a propensity for juries, particularly those composed of
avid fans, to accept the notion that violence and assaults are part of the game. For example,
David Forbes of the Boston Bruins assaulted Henry Boucha, a player for the Minnesota North
Stars during a hockey game. Boucha required remedial surgery for a fracture of the eye socket
and continued to experience double vision six months after the incident. Forbes was indicted
for aggravated assault with a dangerous weapon. State v. Forbes, No. 63280 (Dist. Ct. Minn.,
July 19, 1975). The case ended in a mistrial because of a hung jury. N.Y. Times, July 19,
1975, at 17, col. 2; Kennedy, A Nondecision Begs the Question, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 28,
1975, at 12. NHL President Clarence Campbell, who suspended Forbes for ten games after
the incident, criticized the prosecution of Forbes: 'Courts are not the answer. Discipline
must remain within the sport."' Kennedy, supra, at 12. See Hockey News, Sept. 1, 1975, at
3, col. 1 (effect of Forbes on future enforcement of NHL rules).
League enforcement may in fact be preferable to that administered through the criminal
process. The league is in a better position to define and enforce specific rules of conduct than
are the courts, from which standards could emerge only from a case-by-case interpretation.
Also, the range of conduct that the league might wish to control may well include actions of
a sufficiently minor nature that public prosecution would be unwarranted. Thus, a system
of league control may be more encompassing than that which would be found on the public
side. Moreover, a league system is likely to be more even-handed, since it relies upon central
administration, and thus avoids the variance which might be reflected in the enforcement
practices of individual prosecutors. Finally, the league has interests that are not likely to be
considered fully in a public enforcement action. Concern for preserving the athletic contest
as the primary focus of the fans' attention, concern for the individual club's responsibility to
pay the medical expenses of players, and concern for the cost of crowd control are matters
which are not typically taken account of in public prosecutions. This analysis does not
suggest, however, that it is not proper to use the public criminal law to control particular
kinds of violence.
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duct, the punishment for fighting which is imposed must not be
excessive. Moreover, the league should be prepared to show that it
has pursued an even-handed enforcement policy.
The concern for the public image of the sport may prompt the
league to extend its disciplinary authority to the off-the-field conduct of its athletes. It is in this area that there may be a particularly
lively debate about the range of control which the league may assume. A player may insist that he is hired primarily for his athletic
prowess and that as long as he maintains his physical condition and
performs to the best of his ability in practice and competition, he
has fulfilled his contractual obligation. What he does off-the-field,
it will be contended, is his own business. The league official may
claim, however, that fan interest in sports personalities does not end
at the stadium exit and, due in no small measure to the active sports
press, the image of the sport will often be influenced by the athlete's
off-hours activities. Moreover, it will be contended that the fans'
perception of the athlete on-the-field cannot be disassociated from
what he has done elsewhere.
In trying to weigh the two positions, we again find little guidance
in the case law. There are no sports cases directly on point. Moreover, there appears to be no other industry which practices the type
of control found here, so there are no useful analogies. 2 The cases
dealing with the political and social rights of employees usually
involve an application of constitutional principles. 3 Although some
claim that a sports league involves "state action" and hence is
bound by the Constitution, 4 that appears not to be the case. But
92. There is very little literature dealing with employer disciplinary action generally and
even less which considers the special concerns which surface in the sports area. Some of the
common law principles applicable to employment related discipline are treated in 56 C. J.
S. Master and Servant § 102-08.
93. See, e.g., Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961);
DeGrazio v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 31 111. 2d 482, 202 N.E.2d 522 (1964). See generally Van
AIstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in ConstitutionalLaw, 81 HARV. L.
REV. 1439 (1968).
94. See Discipline in ProfessionalSports, supra note 1, at 791-92. But see Charles 0. Finley
& Co. v. Kuhn, Cause No. 76C2358 (N.D. Ill., Sept. 7, 1976). In his suit against Commissioner
Kuhn for disapproving the sales contracts of players Vida Blue, Rollie Fingers and Joe Rudi,
Charles 0. Finley alleged a deprivation of due process under the fourteenth amendment.
Cause No. 76C2358 at 7. Finley argued that the "state action" necessary for such a claim
consisted of the use by some of the baseball clubs of state-owned stadiums and the "baseball
exemption" from the antitrust laws. Id. Judge McGarr summarily dismissed Finley's argument, noting that "[flor an otherwise private party to be engaged in state action, there must
exist a nexus between the state and the particular activity being challenged." Id. at 8 (citation omitted). No such "nexus" had been alleged, id.; nor is one likely to be found.
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even in the absence of firm authority, some conclusions can be
reached about the types of outside player conduct the league can
hope to control. Again the relevant standard is one of reasonableness. As suggested, that concept is sufficiently flexible to permit the
court to make judgments about the relative weight to be afforded
the respective corporate and individual interests.
There are some types of activities in which concern for the
league's public image is clearly outweighed by the player's right of
personal freedom. While there may have been an earlier time when
owners and league officials could have imposed rigid rules of personal conduct, we are presently operating in an era in which the
individual's private prerogatives are entitled to greater respect.
There are some types of outside activities which will have to be
accepted even though they may not project the image which some
leagues might wish. Thus, despite the somewhat peculiar identification of sports and conservative politics, 5 an athlete's support of an
unpopular political cause is not a proper matter for concern by
sports authorities." It can be accepted that some fans may not like
what the athlete says and may even lose enthusiasm for the team,
but under a "reasonableness" criteria, the athlete's interest should
predominate. The league should not suppose that it has a duty to
insulate its fans from non-conforming behavior which they find unpleasant. The fans do not receive such protection in their other
social contacts, and it is not clear why they should expect it in the
narrow area of sports activities. Moreover, it is common in other
segments of the entertainment industry for the performers to align
themselves with diverse political viewpoints without incurring
industry-imposed punishments. A performer may diminish his box
office attractiveness by such activities, but it is quite another matter whether he should be disciplined for the stands he takes. Finally,
there is the fundamental concern for the players' personal freedom.
Whatever other roles the athlete may fulfill, he continues to be a
citizen in a political system which grants him the prerogatives to
choose his ideological identification. 7 It will require rather compelling circumstances to establish that those rights have been relin95. See J.

MICHENER, SPORTS IN AMERICA,

375-86 (1976). See also P. HocH, RI OFF

THE

BiG

GAME 70-99 (1972).

96. Cf. Ali v. State Athletic Comm'n, 308 F. Supp. 11, 16-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (dictum).
97. Cf. Mitchell v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 196 Cal. App.2d 796, 16 Cal. Rptr.
813 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961) (importance of individual's political rights outweighs union interest
in controlling political behavior; decided on nonconstitutional grounds).
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quished. In light of the limited nature of the contract between an
athlete and his club, the relationship seems not to present such a
case.
This same analysis would apply to other matters as well. The fact
that the athlete chose an unconventional life-style and ignored traditional mores on matters of marriage, family, and the like, would
appear to be beyond the range of the league's proper concerns. It is
true that some aspects of the athlete's life-style might affect his
ability to perform on the field. There is no serious question but that
the employer can demand that the athlete maintain his physical
condition, and the typical standard player contract outlines the
club's prerogatives to deal with these situations." But the determination of whether the athlete has the necessary physical capacity
must be made according to objective criteria and does not provide
the occasion for the persons in authority to impose their personal
preferences as to the life-style to be followed.
A final area which deserves attention involves cases in which the
athlete is involved in criminal activity off-the-field. Some cases
should not present much difficulty. Traffic offenses, scuffles with
the police, and the like should not be viewed as within the area of
appropriate concern for sports officials, even though these usually
receive coverage in the news media and thus may affect how some
fans view the sport. If the players are to retain freedom in conduct98. Standard player contracts typically reserve to the club the right to terminate a player
who fails to maintain adequate physical condition. Under the NFL contract, for example, the
player agrees to submit to a physical examination at the start of each training season. The
contract provides: "[11f the Player fails to establish his excellent physical condition . . . by
the physical examination, or . . . if in the opinion of the Head Coach, Player does not
maintain himself in such excellent condition . . . the Club shall have the right to terminate
6 (1975). See
this contract." Standard Player's Contract, National Football League
generally Hennigan v. Chargers Football Co., 431 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1970); Sample v. Gotham
Football Club, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Schultz v. Los Angeles Dons, Inc., 107
Cal. App. 2d 718, 238 P.2d 73 (Dist. Ct. App. 1951); Tillman v. New Orleans Saints Football
Club, 265 So. 2d 284 (La. Ct. App. 1972); Houston Oilers, Inc. v. Floyd, 518 S.W.2d 836 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1975). If, for example, the player adopts a diet that decreases his stamina and
significantly interferes with his playing performance, the club could conclude properly that
the athlete has failed to maintain his physical condition.
Under the NFL contract, the decision whether the athlete is in "excellent physical condition" is reserved to the discretion of the team physician and the club's head coach. The
contracts used in other leagues, particularly those in which collective bargaining has been
successful, suggest a trend away from giving the club final decision-making authority with
respect to the athlete's condition. Under the new NBA contract, for example, disputes about
the player's condition are resolved within a mechanism agreed to by the owners and the
players' union. See Uniform Player Contract, National Basketball Ass'n, 6(c) (1976) (veteran's contract).
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ing their private lives, such minor brushes with the law are likely
to occur. The leagues should be prepared to tolerate these in order
to give some breathing room for more important personal rights.
As one moves up the scale of seriousness of offenses, however, the
analysis is less simple. 9 Cases likely to cause concern are those
involving capital crimes, such as murder and rape, and lesser sexual
crimes which meet with strong disapproval from fans. Although the
accused murderer may be fully capable of performing his athletic
duties on the field, his presence may prove to be a disruptive force,
either to the fans or to other players. For example, it is not unusual
for fans to seek out a player on their team upon whom to vent their
frustration when the club is losing, and the accused player could
become the object of this derision. Moreover, the normal probing of
the news media is likely to create a heightened sense of controversy,
and the situation could easily develop to the point that the focus of
public attention is shifted from the club's playing efforts to the
turmoil surrounding the particular athlete. Not only would this
undermine the league's main goal, but it could easily have a demoralizing effect upon the performance of the clubs involved.
99. A case which illustrates the difficulty in defining the league's prerogatives in this area
is that involving football player Lance Rentzel. Rentzel, a star performer, as a wide receiver
for the Dallas Cowboys, was suspended from the NFL following two convictions for indecent
exposure and an arrest for drug possession. League Commissioner Rozelle suspended Rentzel
under a rule that authorized such action when a player engages in "conduct detrimental to
the welfare of the League, or professional football ....
" The NFL Players Association,
through its Executive Director Ed Garvey, publicly criticized the suspension and assisted in
filing legal actions to enjoin the continuance of the punishment. The public debate raised
the issues which are considered here. For example, club owners argued for the need for
discipline among players and expressed concern for the distraction that might be caused by
the presence of a controversial figure on the field. Garvey, on the other hand, saw the suspension as an attempt by the Commissioner to legislate the moral standard to be followed by
the players. Others viewed the matter as illustrating the difficulty of drawing a line between
"life-style" and truly detrimental conduct. The resulting debate is summarized in Cady, The
Central Issue: How Much Authority Should the Sports Authorities Have?, N.Y. Times, Aug.
5, 1973, § 5, at 1, col. 1. See also id., Aug. 4, 1973, at 15, col. 2 (Federal Judge Carr refuses to
remove temporarily Rozelle's suspension of Rentzel; suit filed by Rentzel and NFLPA on
ground that suspension for conviction of possession of marijuana and indecent exposure was
" 'arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory'"); id., Aug. 7, 1973, at 41, col. 3 (Los Angeles
Superior Court Judge Thomas issues order for NFL Commissioner and Los Angeles Rams to
show cause for suspension of Rentzel); id., Aug. 24, 1973, at 27, col. 2 (Judge Thomas refuses
Rentzel's request for injunction to end his suspension for conduct detrimental to NFL).
Rentzel's suspension was eventually lifted and he was permitted to play again in the NFL.
Id., May 16, 1974, at 56, col. 1.
For a discussion of the range of discretion enjoyed by the commissioner of baseball in
disciplinary matters, see Durso, Kuhn Can "Punish" Those Who "Undermine" Baseball, id.,
Aug. 5, 1973, § 5, at 2, col. 5.
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There is reason to question whether the anticipated disharmony
is sufficient to justify a suspension, for this same reaction might
occur if a player takes a truly aberrational political position. And
as indicated above, the fact that some third parties might react
adversely seems not to provide a sufficient justification for allowing
the league to control the behavior. The central argument made in
that context - that neither the fans nor the leagues can insist that
they be insulated from unpleasantness - would seem to have some
application here.
In the final analysis, however, it seems preferable to allow the
leagues some prerogative to suspend, at least temporarily, the
player accused of a serious crime. The arguments for requiring tolerance of unpopular political beliefs are not wholly applicable here. 0
It is possible to make an ordering of the relative importance of
particular types of conduct, and on that scale, the exercise of basic
political freedoms must surely come before actions which result in
serious criminal charges. It should be kept in mind that the basic
inquiry is whether the league's act of suspending the player was
reasonable. The league which temporarily suspends the accused
felon would seem to satisfy that standard. Such a suspension might
in fact be quite desirable. It would afford time for explanation and
clarification and avoid the situation in which incomplete details of
the event unnecessarily flamed emotions.
But as this analysis implies, a permanent suspension, or a refusal
to hire an ex-felon, would be difficult to justify. Although the player
might not be able to wholly disassociate himself from his past, it
would be difficult to find the requisite reasonableness in a rule
which did not recognize the possibility of rehabilitation."' Some
fans might refuse to accept the player's efforts to make a new start,
but, again, we are presumably not operating in an era in which
players must project a socially neutral image. 02
FINES V. SUSPENSION

Up to this point, we have been considering situations in which the
punishment imposed for player misconduct was an expulsion or
suspension from the league. It might be asked whether the league's
100. See text accompanying notes 91-93 supra.
101. Cf. note 85 supra.
102. See text accompanying notes 91-93 supra.
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power to fine is treated under the same legal principles." 3 Some
might question whether punishment in the form of a fine has the
characteristics necessary to make out an antitrust violation. 14 It can
be noted that the potential group boycott is more obvious where a
suspension, as opposed to a fine, is imposed.0 5 When a player is
suspended from the league, all league teams are told, in effect, that
it is improper for them to contract with the athlete. There is clearly
a refusal to deal, and by virtue of the league's power to insure
compliance by member clubs, the action is concerted. There is more
difficulty in fitting a monetary fine into this same analysis. One can
legitimately ask whether there is really any boycott, for if the athlete is only fined, he presumably is still allowed to play and earn
103. Leagues frequently use their broad fining power. For example, in the five-year period
prior to 1976 NFL Commissioner Rozelle collected $53,000 in fines from players and approximately $245,000 from NFL clubs. Brief for Appellants NFL & Alvin Ray Rozelle at 46,
Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976). Fines often are used as a
less severe penalty for conduct of the sort discussed above in connection with league-imposed
suspensions. Thus, fines may be imposed against players who engage in fights, see, e.g., N.Y.
Times, April 22, 1976, at 43, col. 1 (ABA Commissioner DeBusschere fines 14 players a total
of $2,200 for fighting during basketball game), or other activities that threaten player safety.
See, e.g., id., May 9, 1976, § 5 at 5, col. 1 (pitcher fined for throwing "beanballs"). Monetary
assessments are also used when players are unduly abusive of referees and umpires, see id.,
Aug. 21, 1975, at 47, col. 1 (Chicago baseball player Bill Madlock fined $200 for throwing
helmet and using abusive language in confrontation with umpire), and for other conduct that
disrupts the orderliness of the game. See id., Oct. 7, 1975, at 31, col. 1 (NBA increases amount
of automatic fines for technicals).
Fines also are used to control conduct in individual sports. In one celebrated case, a $6,000
fine was levied against tennis player Ilie Nastase for public profanity and "not using his best
efforts to win" following a disputed line call. When Nastase initially refused to pay the fine,
which was equal to his second-place prize money, he was suspended from further play by the
Men's International Professional Tennis Council. He eventually paid and secured his reinstatement. See id., Mar. 11, 1976, at 49, col. 1; id., Mar. 16, 1976, at 43, col. 1; id., Mar. 17,
1976, at 26, col. 3.
Before the Nastase incident, the concern for player conduct prompted the international
tennis council to adopt a schedule of fines covering a wide range of behavior. For example, a
player can be fined $1,000 for physically or verbally abusing the umpire, opponents, or
spectators; $1,000 for leaving the court or failing to appear in final ceremonies; $50 for
"unprofessional" dress; and $50 for throwing a racket. A player who accumulates $3,000 in
fines in any twelve month period receives an automatic twenty-one day suspension. See
Winnipeg Free Press, Dec. 9, 1975, at 48, col. 1.
104. There is little authority, either generally or in the sports area, specifically considering
the authority of private groups to use fines to achieve compliance with their rules. In the few
instances in which fining systems in other industries have been reviewed, the focus has
usually been on whether the group can properly impose discipline at all, and the issue of
whether monetary penalties are entitled to greater, or lesser, deference typically has not been
raised. See, e.g., Mechanical Contractors Bid Depository v. Christiansen, 352 F.2d 817 (10th
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 918 (1966). See also E. ROCKEFELLER, ANTITRUsT QUESTIONS
AND ANSWERS 49 (1974).
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his salary. Moreover, there might be some dispute about whether
the requisite concerted action is present. Other clubs may refuse to
deal with the athlete, but this usually has nothing to do with the
fine. The reason, rather, is the fact that the player is under contract
to his club and thus not available for employment with other clubs.
Yet, it would be anomalous if fines required a wholly different
analysis under the antitrust laws. In some cases, a fine might be a
much more severe penalty than a suspension. For example, a lowpaid athlete might prefer to endure a short suspension rather than
pay a fine of several thousand dollars. Moreover, it is clear that the
leagues regard fines and suspensions as part of a singular disciplinary system. The league's ultimate purposes in imposing punishment are basically the same in each case, and the choice of one
sanction rather than the other may merely reflect differences in the
seriousness of the offense, the mental state of the offender, or the
quality of the factual proof.'
A closer analysis should dispel the difficulties mentioned above.
The requisite concerted action can be found if one focuses, not upon
the effect of the sanction in a particular case, but rather upon the
system through which it is imposed. Thus, the antitrust objection
should be directed to the characteristics of the arrangement which
give the leagues power to exact monetary penalties. The clubs have,
in effect, jointly agreed that the league will be empowered to exercise control over the conduct of their employees. The officials who
mete out discipline thus serve as the administrative organ through
which the group achieves its goals in these matters. Moreover, it is
clear that there is a "refusal to deal." Any player coming into the
league is bound by the pre-ordained system, and no club will deal
with a participant except on the terms which prescribe the league's
authority. Thus, while the clubs may not act together in the imposition and enforcement of a particular fine, they have joined together
in structuring the system through which the punishment is imposed. 07
It appears, then, that league fines should be judged under the
same standards which the antitrust laws impose upon suspensions.
105. See text accompanying notes 14 & 15 supra.
106. See note 103 supra.
107. This analysis could be applied to define the antitrust offense when a suspension,
rather than a fine, is involved. Although discussion of suspensions in this Article has focused
upon the coercive nature of the individual suspension and not on the system under which the
power to suspend was exercised, the requisite refusal to deal could be found at either level.
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Fines may only be used to punish conduct which is within the range
of the league's self-regulatory powers. Such penalities cannot be
used as a device to protect the league from outside competition, nor
may they be used to control behavior which does not affect legitimate league interests.'"' Moreover, the amount of the fine must be
reasonably related to the quality of the interest at stake, and the
disciplinary authorities must be sensitive to the need for differentiated treatment of the various degrees of misconduct which might
arise.'" Finally, an accused player is entitled to procedural safeguards in the proceeding in which the fine is imposed." 0 For large
fines, the required procedures may be as elaborate as those which
accompany suspension. Where small fines are involved, less formality will be tolerated.
DISCIPLINE BY INDIVIDUAL CLUBS

Most sports leagues recognize the right of individual clubs to
enforce their own disciplinary rules."' These usually pertain to matters which are of a more direct interest to the club and may include
such things as curfews, training rules, and rules concerning the players' obligations to follow orders given by the coaching staff., The
sanctions imposed may range from small fines to suspensions."'
Are the disciplinary actions of a club subject to review under the
antitrust laws? On the surface, there might be reason to question
whether they involve the sort of joint action which will establish a
concerted refusal to deal. That feature is present in league disciplinary action because the league derives its authority from the collective agreement of the member clubs. Yet, where a club takes action
which affects only its own employees, it is less clear that the requisite conspiracy is present.
There are no cases which address the question of how discipline
by individual clubs should be characterized for antitrust purposes.
108. See text accompanying notes 61-67 supra.
109. See notes 85 & 86 supra & accompanying text.
110. See text accompanying notes 29-63 supra.
111. The standard player contract usually contains provisions authorizing the club to
enforce a variety of disciplinary rules. See, e.g., Standard Player's Contract, National Foot-

ball League

4 (1975).

112. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1975, at 25, col. 3 (WFL player Anthony Davis fined
$500 for disrespectful remarks to assistant coach); Los Angeles Times, Aug. 31, 1975, Pt. Ill,
at 2, col. 2 (baseball player Dock Ellis suspended thirty days for "insubordination"; reinstated, but still required to pay "substantial" fine).
113. See note 108 supra.
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But there is another view of the club's authority which suggests that
it should be subject to the same standard of review which is applied
to league-imposed discipline. Rather than focusing on the particular
disciplinary action - which appears to involve only a single employer and its employee - it is useful to consider the source of the
authority which is being exercised. In most leagues, a club's right
to control a player's conduct arises from the contract which is entered into with the employee. That contract, however, is not wholly
the product of individual negotiation between the two parties. In
most cases, the basic outline of the agreement is prescribed by the
league and embodied in a uniform player's contract which all clubs
must use. One of the uniform terms is that which exacts the player's
agreement to abide by the rules which the club imposes." 4 There
may be differences among leagues in the extent to which such terms
are subject to modification through the individual negotiations between the player and the club."' But where such variations are not
allowed, it can be argued that the club's disciplinary authority is
indeed the product of a concerted refusal to deal. The clubs have in
effect agreed that they will not contract with a player except upon
terms which reserve to them authority to control the player's conduct. And while a club might otherwise have sought to retain that
right even without the joint agreement, a uniform provision for club
discipline is partially intended to serve the interest of the league as
a whole. The image of the league as sponsoring competition between
teams of athletes who are serious, dedicated, and well-trained will
be promoted if each club accepts responsibility for controlling its
own employees. Thus, the common agreement on the need for discipline by individual employers can be seen as a part of the larger
design to ensure the success of the joint venture. If this theory is
accepted, discipline by individual clubs would be treated under the
same standards applied to league discipline.
CONCLUSION

The notion that the antitrust laws provide a basis for judicial
review of sports discipline might be resisted by some, particularly
those involved in professional sports administration. While such a
reaction may confirm the relative novelty of this use of the antitrust
114. See, e.g., Standard Player's Contract, National Football League 4 (1975).
115. Cf. Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles, 407 F. Supp. 717, 724-25 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
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laws, there should be little question about the propriety of the proposition that antitrust principles have a role to play in this area.
Their applicability has been accepted in the few sports cases which
have arisen, and the trend of general precedents dealing with private group action leaves little doubt as to the correctness of this
approach. As the prior discussion is intended to suggest, it seems
more appropriate that attention be focused on, not whether, but
rather how antitrust principles will affect discipline in professional
sports.
Often when it is discovered that federal law intrudes into an area
previously unregulated, there are cries of despair from those involved in the day-to-day operation of the activity affected. Typically, the concern is that significant new administrative burdens
will be imposed and that those in charge will be prevented from
doing what needs to be done. On the basis of the prior discussion,
it can be suggested that any such fears are unfounded in the sports
area. The fact that disciplinary decisions are reviewable under the
antitrust laws does not mean that sports authorities cannot control
player conduct. As suggested, such controls are fully appropriate for
many types of misconduct, and the imposition of discipline should
not prompt extensive litigation. What the antitrust laws do mean,
however, is that both leagues and clubs must act -responsibly in
defining and administering their disciplinary systems. Proper reflection in defining the range of the entity's legitimate interest and
in structuring the disciplinary proceeding should provide adequate
protection against unwanted litigation.

